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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-1833
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MICHAEL E. LINCOLN, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE
INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, et al., PETITIONERS
v. GROVER VIGIL et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the tenth circuit
[May 24, 1993]

  Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
  For several years in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
Indian Health Service provided diagnostic and treatment
services, referred to collectively as the Indian Children's
Program, to handicapped Indian children in the South-
west.  In 1985, the Service decided to reallocate the
Program's resources to a nationwide effort to assist such
children.  We hold that the Service's decision to discon-
tinue the Program was -committed to agency discretion
by law- and therefore not subject to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5  U. S. C. 701(a)(2),
and that the Service's exercise of that discretion was not
subject to the notice-and-comment rulemaking require-
ments imposed by 553.

                            I
  The Indian Health Service, an agency within the Public
Health Service of the Department of Health and Human
Services, provides health care for some 1.5 million Ameri-
can Indian and Alaska Native people.  Brief for Petition-
ers 2.  The Service receives yearly lump-sum appropria-
tions from Congress and expends the funds under author-
ity of the Snyder Act, 25 U. S. C. 13, and the Indian

Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U. S. C. 1601 et seq.
So far as it concerns us here, the Snyder Act authorizes
the Service to -expend such moneys as Congress may from
time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and assis-
tance of the Indians,- for the -relief of distress and
conservation of health.-  25 U. S. C. 13.  The Improve-
ment Act authorizes expenditures for, inter alia, Indian
mental-health care, and specifically for -therapeutic and
residential treatment centers.-  25 U. S. C. 1621(a)(4)(D).
  The Service employs roughly 12,000 people and operates
more than 500 health-care facilities in the continental
United States and Alaska.  See Hearings on Department
of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for
1993 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, p. 32 (1992);
Brief for Petitioners 2.  This case concerns a collection of
related services, commonly known as the Indian Children's
Program, that the Service provided from 1978 to 1985.
In the words of the Court of Appeals, a -clou[d of] bureau-
cratic haze- obscures the history of the Program, Vigil v.
Rhoades, 953 F. 2d 1225, 1226 (CA10 1992), which seems
to have grown out of a plan -to establish therapeutic and
residential treatment centers for disturbed Indian chil-
dren.-  H. R. Rep. No. 94-1026, pt. 1, p. 80 (1976) (pre-
pared in conjunction with enactment of the Improvement
Act).  These centers were to be established under a -major
cooperative care agreement- between the Service and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, id., at 81, and would have
provided such children -with intensive care in a residen-
tial setting.-  Id., at 80.
  Congress never expressly appropriated funds for these
centers.  In 1978, however, the Service allocated approxi-
mately $292,000 from its fiscal year 1978 appropriation
to its office in Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the planning
and development of a pilot project for handicapped Indian
children, which became known as the Indian Children's
Program.  See 953 F. 2d, at 1227.  The pilot project
apparently convinced the Service that a building was
needed, and, in 1979, the Service requested $3.5 million
from Congress to construct a diagnostic and treatment
center for handicapped Indian children.  See id., at 1227;
Hearings on Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1980 before a Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 8, p. 250 (1979) (hereinafter House Hearings
(Fiscal Year 1980)).  The appropriation for fiscal year 1980
did not expressly provide the requested funds, however,
and legislative reports indicated only that Congress had
increased the Service's funding by $300,000 for nationwide
expansion and development of the Program in coordination
with the Bureau.  See H. R. Rep. No. 96-374, pp. 82-83
(1979); S. Rep. No. 96-363, p. 91 (1979).
  Plans for a national program to be managed jointly by
the Service and the Bureau were never fulfilled, however,
and the Program continued simply as an offering of the
Service's Albuquerque office, from which the Program's
staff of 11 to 16 employees would make monthly visits to
Indian communities in New Mexico and Southern Colorado
and on the Navajo and Hopi Reservations.  Brief for
Petitioners 6.  The Program's staff provided -diagnostic,
evaluation, treatment planning and followup services- for
Indian children with emotional, educational, physical, or
mental handicaps.  -For parents, community groups, school
personnel and health care personnel,- the staff provided
-training in child development, prevention of handicapping
conditions, and care of the handicapped child.-  Hearings
on Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1984 before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 3, p. 374 (1983) (Service submission) (hereinafter
House Hearings (Fiscal Year 1984)).  Congress never
authorized or appropriated monies expressly for the
Program, and the Service continued to pay for its regional
activities out of annual lump-sum appropriations from
1980 to 1985, during which period the Service repeatedly
apprised Congress of the Program's continuing operation.
See, e.g., Hearings on Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1985 before a Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Appropriations,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, p. 486 (1984) (Service submis-
sion); House Hearings (Fiscal Year 1984), pt. 3, pp. 351,
374 (same); Hearings on Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983 before a Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Appropriations,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, p. 167 (1982) (same); Hearings
on Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1982 before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 9, p. 71 (1981) (testimony of Service Director); Hear-
ings on Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1981 before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 3, p. 632 (1980) (Service submission); House Hearings
(Fiscal Year 1980), pt. 8, pp. 245-252 (testimony of
Service officials); H. R. Rep. No. 97-942, p. 110 (1982)
(House Appropriations Committee -is pleased to hear of
the continued success of the Indian Children's Program-).
  Nevertheless, the Service had not abandoned the proposal
for a nationwide treatment program, and in June 1985 it
notified those who referred patients to the Program that
it was -re-evaluating [the Program's] purpose . . . as a
national mental health program for Indian children and
adolescents.-  App. 77.  In August 1985, the Service
determined that Program staff hitherto assigned to provide
direct clinical services should be reassigned as consultants
to other nationwide Service programs, 953 F. 2d, at 1226,
and discontinued the direct clinical services to Indian
children in the Southwest.  The Service announced its
decision in a memorandum, dated August 21, 1985,
addressed to Service offices and Program referral sources:
-As you are probably aware, the Indian Children's
Program has been involved in planning activities
focusing on a national program effort.  This process
has included the termination of all direct clinical
services to children in the Albuquerque, Navajo and
Hopi reservation service areas.  During the months
of August and September, . . . staff will [see] children
followed by the program in an effort to update pro-
grams, identify alternative resources and facilitate
obtaining alternative services.  In communities where
there are no identified resources, meetings with
community service providers will be scheduled to
facilitate the networking between agencies to secure
or advocate for appropriate services.-  App. 80.
The Service invited public -input- during this -difficult
transition,- and explained that the reallocation of re-
sources had been -motivated by our goal of increased
mental health services for all Indian [c]hildren.-  Ibid.
  Respondents, handicapped Indian children eligible to
receive services through the Program, subsequently
brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief
against petitioners, the Director of the Service and others
(collectively, the Service), in the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico.  Respondentsalleged, inter alia, that the Service's decision to discontinue
direct clinical services violated the federal trust respon-
sibility to Indians, the Snyder Act, the Improvement Act,
the Administrative Procedure Act, various agency regula-
tions, and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
  The District Court granted summary judgment for
respondents.  Vigil v. Rhoades, 746 F. Supp. 1471 (NM
1990).  The District Court held that the Service's decision
to discontinue the Program was subject to judicial review,
rejecting the argument that the Service's decision was
-committed to agency discretion by law- under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. 701(a)(2).  746
F. Supp., at 1479.  The court declined on ripeness
grounds, however, to address the merits of the Service's
action.  It held that the Service's decision to discontinue
the Program amounted to the making of a -legislative
rule- subject to the APA's notice-and-comment require-
ments, 5 U. S. C. 553, and that the termination was also
subject to the APA's publication requirements for the
adoption of -statements of general policy,- 552(a)(1)(D).
See 746 F. Supp., at 1480, 1483.  Because the Service had
not met these procedural requirements, the court con-
cluded that the termination was procedurally invalid and
that judicial review would be -premature.-  Id., at 1483.
The court ordered the Service to reinstate the Program,
id., at 1486-1487, and the Solicitor General has represent-
ed that a reinstated Program is now in place.  Brief for
Petitioners 9.
  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Like the District Court,
it rejected the Service's argument that the decision to
discontinue the Program was committed to agency discre-
tion under the APA.  Although the court concededly could
identify no statute or regulation even mentioning the
Program, see 953 F. 2d, at 1229, it believed that the
repeated references to it in the legislative history of the
annual appropriations Acts, supra, at 4, -in combination
with the special relationship between the Indian people
and the federal government,- 953 F. 2d, at 1230, provided
a basis for judicial review.  The Court of Appeals also
affirmed the District Court's ruling that the Service was
subject to the APA's notice-and-comment procedures in
terminating the Program, reasoning that our decision in
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199 (1974), requires as much
whenever the Federal Government -`cuts back congressio-
nally created and funded programs for Indians.'-  953
F. 2d, at 1231 (citation omitted).  The Court of Appeals
did not consider whether the APA's publication require-
ments applied to the Service's decision to terminate the
Program or whether the District Court's order to reinstate
the Program was a proper form of relief, an issue the
Service had failed to raise.  Id., at 1231-1232.  We
granted certiorari to address the narrow questions pre-
sented by the Court of Appeals's decision.  506 U. S. ___
(1992).

                           II
  First is the question whether it was error for the Court
of Appeals to hold the substance of the Service's decision
to terminate the Program reviewable under the APA.  The
Act provides that -[a] person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof,- 5 U. S. C. 702, and
we have read the Act as embodying a -basic presumption
of judicial review.-  Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U. S. 136, 140 (1967).  This is -just- a presumption,
however, Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467
U. S. 340, 349 (1984), and under 701(a)(2) agency action
is not subject to judicial review -to the extent that- such
action -is committed to agency discretion by law.-  As we
explained in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 830 (1985),
701(a)(2) makes it clear that -review is not to be had-
in those rare circumstances where the relevant statute -is
drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.-
See also Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 599-600 (1988);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S.
402, 410 (1971).  -In such a case, the statute (`law') can
be taken to have `committed' the decisionmaking to the
agency's judgment absolutely.-  Heckler, supra, at 830.
  Over the years, we have read 701(a)(2) to preclude
judicial review of certain categories of administrative deci-
sions that courts traditionally have regarded as -commit-
ted to agency discretion.-  See Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); Webster, supra, at 609
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  In Heckler itself, we held an
agency's decision not to institute enforcement proceedings
to be presumptively unreviewable under 701(a)(2).  470
U. S., at 831.  An agency's -decision not to enforce often
involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors
which are peculiarly within its expertise,- ibid., and for
this and other good reasons, we concluded, -such a
decision has traditionally been `committed to agency
discretion.'-  Id., at 832.  Similarly, in ICC v. Locomotive
Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 282 (1987), we held that
701(a)(2) precludes judicial review of another type of
administrative decision traditionally left to agency discre-
tion, an agency's refusal to grant reconsideration of an
action because of material error.  In so holding, we
emphasized -the impossibility of devising an adequate
standard of review for such agency action.-  Ibid.  Finally,
in Webster, supra, at 599-601, we held that 701(a)(2)
precludes judicial review of a decision by the Director of
Central Intelligence to terminate an employee in the
interests of national security, an area of executive action
-in which courts have long been hesitant to intrude.-
Franklin, supra, at ___ (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
  The allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation
is another administrative decision traditionally regarded
as committed to agency discretion.  After all, the very
point of a lump-sum appropriation is to give an agency
the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet
its statutory responsibilities in what it sees as the most
effective or desirable way.  See International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers of America v. Donovan, 241 U. S. App. D. C. 122,
128, 746 F. 2d 855, 861 (1984) (Scalia, J.) (-A lump-sum
appropriation leaves it to the recipient agency (as a
matter of law, at least) to distribute the funds among
some or all of the permissible objects as it sees fit-)
(footnote omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Automobile
Workers v. Brock, 474 U. S. 825 (1985); 2 United States
General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropri-
ations Law, p. 6-159 (2d ed. 1992).  For this reason, a
fundamental principle of appropriations law is that where
-Congress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without
statutorily restricting what can be done with those funds,
a clear inference arises that it does not intend to impose
legally binding restrictions, and indicia in committee
reports and other legislative history as to how the funds
should or are expected to be spent do not establish any
legal requirements on- the agency.  LTV Aerospace Corp.,
55 Comp. Gen. 307, 319 (1975); cf. American Hospital
Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (statements in
committee reports do not have the force of law); Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 191 (1978) (-Ex-
pressions of committees dealing with requests for appropri-
ations cannot be equated with statutes enacted by Con-
gress-).  Put another way, a lump-sum appropriation
reflects a congressional recognition that an agency must
be allowed -flexibility to shift . . . funds within a particu-
lar . . . appropriation account so that- the agency -can
make necessary adjustments for `unforeseen develop-
ments'- and -`changing requirements.'-  LTV Aerospace
Corp., supra, at 318 (citation omitted).
  Like the decision against instituting enforcement pro-
ceedings, then, an agency's allocation of funds from a
lump-sum appropriation requires -a complicated balancing
of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise-: whether its -resources are best spent- on one
program or another; whether it -is likely to succeed- in
fulfilling its statutory mandate; whether a particular
program -best fits the agency's overall policies-; and,
-indeed, whether the agency has enough resources- to fund
a program -at all.-  Heckler, 470 U. S., at 831.  As in
Heckler, so here, the -agency is far better equipped than
the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the
proper ordering of its priorities.-  Id., at 831-832.  Of
course, an agency is not free simply to disregard statutory
responsibilities: Congress may always circumscribe agency
discretion to allocate resources by putting restrictions in
the operative statutes (though not, as we have seen, just
in the legislative history).  See id., at 833.  And, of
course, we hardly need to note that an agency's decision
to ignore congressional expectations may expose it to
grave political consequences.  But as long as the agency
allocates funds from a lump-sum appropriation to meet
permissible statutory objectives, 701(a)(2) gives the courts
no leave to intrude.  -[T]o [that] extent,- the decision to
allocate funds -is committed to agency discretion by law.-
701(a)(2).
  The Service's decision to discontinue the Program is
accordingly unreviewable under 701(a)(2).  As the Court
of Appeals recognized, the appropriations Acts for the
relevant period do not so much as mention the Program,
and both the Snyder Act and the Improvement Act
likewise speak about Indian health only in general terms.
It is true that the Service repeatedly apprised Congress
of the Program's continued operation, but, as we have
explained, these representations do not translate through
the medium of legislative history into legally binding
obligations.  The reallocation of agency resources to assist
handicapped Indian children nationwide clearly falls
within the Service's statutory mandate to provide health
care to Indian people, see supra, at 2, and respondents,
indeed, do not seriously contend otherwise.  The decision
to terminate the Program was committed to the Service's
discretion.
  The Court of Appeals saw a separate limitation on the
Service's discretion in the special trust relationship
existing between Indian people and the Federal Govern-
ment.  953 F. 2d, at 1230-1231.  We have often spoken
of this relationship, see, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831) (Marshall, C. J.) (Indians' -relation to
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guard-
ian-), and the law is -well established that the Govern-
ment in its dealings with Indian tribal property acts in
a fiduciary capacity.-  United States v. Cherokee Nation
of Oklahoma, 480 U. S. 700, 707 (1987); see also Quick
Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50, 80 (1908) (distinguishing
between money appropriated to fulfill treaty obligations,
to which trust relationship attaches, and -gratuitous
appropriations-).  Whatever the contours of that relation-
ship, though, it could not limit the Service's discretion to
reorder its priorities from serving a subgroup of beneficia-
ries to serving the broader class of all Indians nationwide.
See Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F. 2d 1097, 1102
(CA9 1986) (Federal Government -does have a fiduciary
obligation to the Indians; but it is a fiduciary obligation
that is owed to all Indian tribes-) (emphasis added).
  One final note: although respondents claimed in the
District Court that the Service's termination of the
Program violated their rights under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, see supra, at 5-6, that
court expressly declined to address respondents' constitu-
tional arguments, 746 F. Supp., at 1483, as did the Court
of Appeals.  953 F. 2d, at 1228-1229, n. 3.  Thus, while
the APA contemplates, in the absence of a clear expres-
sion of contrary congressional intent, that judicial review
will be available for colorable constitutional claims, see
Webster, 486 U. S., at 603-604, the record at this stage
does not allow mature consideration of constitutional
issues, which we leave for the Court of Appeals on
remand.

                           III
  We next consider the Court of Appeals's holding, quite
apart from the matter of substantive reviewability, that
before terminating the Program the Service was required
to abide by the familiar notice-and-comment rulemaking
provisions of the APA, 5 U. S. C. 553.  Section 553
provides generally that an agency must publish notice of
a proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and afford
-interested persons an opportunity to participate . . .
through submission of written data, views, or arguments.-
553(b), (c).  The same section also generally requires
the agency to publish a rule not less than 30 days before
its effective date and incorporate within it -a concise
general statement- of the rule's -basis and purpose.-
553(c), (d).  There are exceptions, of course.  Section
553 has no application, for example, to -a matter relating
to agency management or personnel or to public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.-  553(a)(2).  The
notice-and-comment requirements apply, moreover, only
to so-called -legislative- or -substantive- rules; they do not
apply to -interpretative rules, general statements of policy,
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.-
553(b).  See McLouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas,
267 U. S. App. D. C. 367, 370, 838 F. 2d 1317, 1320
(1988); Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, 260
U. S App. D. C. 294, 296-297, 818 F. 2d 943, 945-946
(1987) (per curiam); id., at 301-303, 818 F. 2d, at 950-952
(Starr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use
Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L. J. 1311, 1321
(1992); see generally Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S.
281, 301 (1979) (noting that this is -[t]he central distinc-
tion among agency regulations found in the APA-).
  It is undisputed that the Service did not abide by these
notice-and-comment requirements before discontinuing the
Program and reallocating its resources.  The Service
argues that it was free from any such obligation because
its decision to terminate the Program did not qualify as
a -rule- within the meaning of the APA.  Brief for Peti-
tioners 29-34.  Respondents, to the contrary, contend that
the Service's action falls well within the Act's broad
definition of that term.  551(4).  Brief for Respondents
17-19.  Determining whether an agency's statement is
what the APA calls a -rule- can be a difficult exercise.
We need not conduct that exercise in this case, however.
For even assuming that a statement terminating the
Program would qualify as a -rule- within the meaning of
the APA, it would be exempt from the notice-and-comment
requirements of 553.  Termination of the Program
might be seen as affecting the Service's organization, but
-rules of agency organization- are exempt from notice-and-
comment requirements under 553(b)(A).  Moreover,
553(b)(A) also exempts -general statements of policy,-
which we have previously described as -`statements issued
by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the
manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a
discretionary power.'-  Chrysler Corp., supra, at 302, n. 31
(quoting Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act 30, n. 3 (1947)).  Whatever else may be
considered a -general statemen[t] of policy,- the term
surely includes an announcement like the one before us,
that an agency will discontinue a discretionary allocation
of unrestricted funds from a lump-sum appropriation.
  Our decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971), confirms our conclusion
that the Service was not required to follow the notice-and-
comment procedures of 553 before terminating the
Program.  Overton Park dealt with the Secretary of
Transportation's decision to authorize the use of federal
funds to construct an interstate highway through a public
park in Memphis, Tennessee.  Private citizens and conser-
vation organizations claimed that the Secretary's decision
violated federal statutes prohibiting the use of federal
funds for such a purpose where there existed a -`feasible
and prudent'- alternative route, id., at 405 (citations
omitted), and argued, inter alia, that the Secretary's
determination was subject to judicial review under the
APA's -substantial evidence- standard, 5 U. S. C.
706(2)(E).  401 U. S., at 414.  In rejecting that conten-
tion, we explained that the substantial-evidence test
applies, in addition to circumstances not relevant here,
only where -agency action is taken pursuant to [the]
rulemaking provision[s]- of 553.  We held unequivocally
that -[t]he Secretary's decision to allow the expenditure
of federal funds to build [the highway] through [the park]
was plainly not an exercise of a rulemaking function.-
Id., at 414.
  Overton Park is authority here for the proposition that
decisions to expend otherwise unrestricted funds are not,
without more, subject to the notice-and-comment require-
ments of 553.  Although the Secretary's determination
in Overton Park was subject to statutory criteria of
-`feasib[ility] and pruden[ce],'- id., at 405, the generality
of those standards underscores the administrative discre-
tion inherent in the determination (reviewable though it
was), to which the Service's discretionary authority to
meet its obligations under the Snyder and Improvement
Acts is comparable.  Indeed, respondents seek to distin-
guish Overton Park principally on the ground that the
Service's determination altered the eligibility criteria for
Service assistance.  See Brief for Respondents 24-25.  But
the record fails to support the distinction, there being no
indication that the Service's decision to discontinue the
Program (or, for that matter, to initiate it) did anything
to modify eligibility standards for Service care, as distinct
from affecting the availability of services in a particular
geographic area.  The Service's decision to reallocate funds
presumably did mean that respondents would no longer
receive certain services, but it did not alter the Service's
criteria for providing assistance any more than the
Service's initiation of the pilot project in 1978 altered the
criteria for assistance to Indians in South Dakota.
  Nor, finally, do we think that the Court of Appeals was
on solid ground in holding that Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S.
199 (1974), required the Service to abide by the APA's
notice-and-comment provisions before terminating the
Program.  Those provisions were not at issue in Ruiz,
where respondents challenged a provision, contained in a
Bureau of Indian Affairs manual, that restricted eligibility
for Indian assistance.  Although the Bureau's own regula-
tions required it to publish the provision in the Federal
Register, the Bureau had failed to do so.  Id., at 233-234.
We held that the Bureau's failure to abide by its own
procedures rendered the provision invalid, stating that,
under those circumstances, the denial of benefits would
be -inconsistent with `the distinctive obligation of trust
incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these
dependent and sometimes exploited people.'-  Id., at 236
(quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286,
296 (1942)).  No such circumstances exist here.

                           IV
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
                                      It is so ordered.